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RECENT CASES
will again be abandoned in favor of an absolute right."' Until this
occurs, however, the impact on individual parolees will be disastrous.
The decision not to require counsel at the preliminary hearing will
result in more findings of probable cause. This, coupled with the pa-
rolee's inability to be released on bail or on his own recognizance in
order to gather evidence on his own behalf, will result in more revo-
cations. More revocations will in turn mean more reincarcerations
which will result in a disruption of the rehabilitative process. This
will occur because the parolee will be torn from his family and job
and suffer damage to his already marred reputation. Thus, he will
have difficulty in establishing in his employer, the community at
large, and perhaps in himself as well, a confidence in his eventual re-
habilitation. Moreover, the instant decision will increase the parole
board's discretion, thereby increasing the parolee's perception that
someone can deprive him of his liberty arbitrarily. Such a perception
might very well do permanent damage to the parolee's chances for a
rehabilitated belief in due process of law to the detriment of the
very correctional process for which the parole system was designed.
PEGGY RABKIN
CRIMINAL LAW-NEW YORK ADOPTS THE INEVITABLE Dis-
COVERY EXCEPTION-UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY OF WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
AND SEARCHES-STRIKES DOWN DEATH PENALTY STATUTE.
On the night of September 8, 1969, at approximately 9 p.m., peti-
tioner robbed a service station attendant in Canastota, New York,
fleeing with the attendant's wallet and the station's cash receipts in an
automobile belonging to a friend. A few minutes after the holdup,
two policemen identified the automobile and proceeded to stop and
question the petitioner. Suddenly, he produced a revolver and fa-
tally shot both police officers. Before losing consciousness, however, one
of the officers transmitted the petitioner's last name and the car's
license number to headquarters. Meanwhile, petitioner abandoned
his friend's car and forced a woman to drive him in her own auto-
of the Bettes v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) case-by-case approach as a continuing
source of litigation in both state and federal courts.
81. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962).
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mobile to Syracuse. He separated from her at a location near his
house. That same night the Syracuse authorities traced the holdup
vehicle to the friend of the petitioner. They learned that his full name
was Martin Fitzpatrick and determined that an individual by that
name owned a house not far from where the abducted woman had
last seen the petitioner. At 8 a.m. the following morning police offi-
cers, acting without any warrant, surrounded the petitioner's home,
knocked and identified themselves. Receiving no response, they pro-
ceeded to enter and search for their suspect. Petitioner, hiding in a
closet, surrendered to the police who then took him into the hall a
few feet away where he was handcuffed, advised of his rights, and
questioned about the murder weapon. Petitioner disclosed that it was
on a shelf in the closet where he had concealed himself. The police
immediately searched for and seized the weapon. At a subsequent sup-
pression hearing, the arresting officers testified that the petitioner had
been given the Miranda' warnings, but the trial court ruled that it
lacked sufficient information to find that the Miranda requirement
had been met. Petitioner's oral statements to the police were accord-
ingly excluded, but the revolver was admitted into evidence because
"proper police investigation would (in any event) have resulted in
a search of that closet and . . . discovery [of the weapon]."12 At trial,
the jury found the petitioner guilty of murder and the court imposed
the death sentence. The petitioner appealed his conviction and sent-
ence, contending that the revolver should not have been admitted
into evidence and that New York's death penalty statute3 was un-
constitutional. Held, that the revolver was properly admitted into
evidence as it would have inevitably been discovered in the normal
course of a police investigation; that the entry and search of petitioner's
residence and his consequent arrest by the police acting without war-
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 505, 300 N.E.2d 139, 140-41, 346 N.Y.S.2d
793, 795, state's petition for cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3291 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1973) (No.
73-442), defendant's petition for cert. denied, - U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Nov. 21, 1973) (No.
73-5370).
3. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.30, .35 (McKinney 1967) provide in part that where
a defendant has been convicted of the murder of a police officer who was killed in the
performance of his official duties, any relevant evidence, not legally privileged, may be
presented to the jury by the prosecution or defense at a so-called "penalty trial." The
exclusionary rules are not applicable. The court will impose the death sentence if
unanimous agreement is reached by the jury. See notes 70-71 infra.
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rants did not violate petitioner's fourth amendment rights;4 and that
New York's statute which leaves infliction of the death penalty to the
discretion of the jury constitutes cruel and unusual punishment viola-
tive of the eighth amendment.5 People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499,
300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, state's petition for cert. denied,
42 U.S.L.W. 3291 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1973) (No. 73-442), defendant's
petition for cert. denied, - U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Nov. 21, 1973) (No.
73-5370) .6
THE EXCLUSION OF TAINTED DERIvATIVE EVIDENCE
AND THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION
In order to enforce the provisions of the fourth amendment, the
Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States7 adopted the exclusionary
rule. With that rule, federal courts have barred the admission at trial
of any evidence obtained through illegal conduct on the part of fed-
eral law enforcement officers. The purpose of the exclusionary sanc-
tion is to prevent the prosecution from profiting by the government's
own wrongdoing. The coincidental benefit to the defendant who suc-
cessfully invokes the rule is a necessary consequence of the rule, but
not an intended objective.8
The exclusionary rule was first applied to primary evidence
which is that evidence acquired during an unlawful search and seizure.
In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,) the Supreme Court
extended the scope of the rule so that evidence derived from the
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."
6. Hereinafter cited as the instant case.
7. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), mandated that
the states apply the exclusionary rule in their own trial proceedings. See text accompany-
ing note 23 infra.
8. Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amendment and the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 55 J. CasM. L.C. & P.S. 307, 308 (1964).
9. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The government attempted to support a subpoena duces
tecum with information derived from photographic copies of illegally seized documents.
The originals previously had been returned to the petitioner under court order.
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primary evidence was also subject to exclusion.' 0 The Court stated
the exclusionary rule for secondary evidence in the following manner:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in
a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course
this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and in-
accessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source
they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the
Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed."
This comment left an important loophole for prosecutors. If the gov-
ernment demonstrates that a lawful source disclosed the same facts
which were developed from illegally obtained evidence, those facts
could still be used at trial.
The decision of Nardone v. United States'2 became the first
modification of the independent source rule. In Nardone evidence was
procured by a wiretap in violation of § 605 of the Federal Communi-
cations Act.'3 The government argued that even though Silverthorne
bars the introduction at trial of tainted derivative evidence, the
prosecution remains free to make any other use of the proscribed
evidence. The Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the case for a
new trial. In doing so, the Court made the following comment:
Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between in-
formation [derived from the unlawful conduct] and the Govern-
ment's proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection
may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.14
Thus, prosecutors were left with a new exception. Besides showing
an independent source, if the government could convince the trial
court that the relationship between the primary and derivative evi-
dence was attenuated, the latter would be admissible.
10. Evidence derived from unlawfully seized evidence has been dubbed "fruit of
the poisonous tree." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The primary
evidence is the poisonous tree; the secondary evidence is, of course, its fruit. Pitler,
"The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. RFv. 579,
581 (1968). In the instant case the defendant's revelation of the gun's location is the
primary evidence ("poisonous tree") and the pistol, the bullets, and the proof that two
of the bullets used in the murder came from that pistol is the secondary evidence
("fruit").
11. 251 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934).
13. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
14. Id. at 341.
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In Wong Sun v. United States,15 the Supreme Court made its
most recent revision in the standard for the admissibility of deriva-
tive evidence. Federal agents had made an unlawful arrest and search
which resulted in incriminating statements by the defendant. The
Court stated that the relevant question in assessing the admissibility
of derivative evidence was
whether granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence
to which instant objection is made has been come at by means suffi-
ciently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.1
This formulation of the standard is currently applied by the courts.'
7
In order for a defendant to take advantage of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine, he must first demonstrate that the conduct
of the law enforcement officers was illegal. If the court agrees, it is
the duty of the government to show that evidence introduced at trial
is not the direct or indirect consequence of the illegality.'8 To accom-
plish this, the prosecution might establish that the evidence was ob-
tained through an independent source,19 or that the source was so at-
tenuated as to dissipate the taint,20 or that the information was de-
veloped through means that did not exploit the illegal conduct.21
The evidence is excluded if the prosecution cannot meet this burden,
and the trial proceeds.
The "inevitable discovery" exception is a recent refinement of
Silverthorne and its progeny. In practice, a court following this ex-
ception will receive questioned evidence if the prosecution can prove
that, in the absence of objectionable police conduct, the evidence
15. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
16. Professor Pitler argues that the more cogent inquiry should be whether or not
the purpose of the exclusionary rule will be served by admitting the evidence. In other
words, will illegal police conduct be deterred? Pitler, supra note 10, at 588-89.
17. Violation of the fourth amendment guarantee against unlawful searches is not
the only area to which Silverthorne has been applied. The Nardone decision illustrates
that the Court will exclude evidence derived from information procured in violation of a
statute. Wong Sun indicates that information obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest
is also inadmissible. See also Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) (violation
of McNabb-Mallory rule); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineup identi-
fication procedure).
18. Nardone v. United Staes, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Maguire, supra note 8,
at 309-10; Pitler, supra note 10, at 647-49.
19. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
20. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
21. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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would have been discovered through lawful means.2 2 The United
States Supreme Court has yet to pass upon this exception.
Mapp v. Ohio23 imposed the use of the exclusionary rule upon
the states. Prior to Mapp, New York courts did not exclude primary
evidence obtained by illegal means nor evidence derived from such
primary evidence.2 4 People v. Rodriguez25 presented the first oppor-
tunity for the New York Court of Appeals to consider the admissi-
bility of tainted secondary evidence. In Rodriguez, the court held
that where a defendant makes incriminating statements as a result
of being confronted with illegally seized evidence, those statements
may not be admitted at trial in accordance with Silverthorne.0-
The court of appeals has continued to face the problem of ad-
missibility of derivative evidence since Rodriguez.2 7 The standards
used by the court were direct applications of the rules handed down
in Silverthorne, Nardone, and Wong Sun. However, in People V.
Mendez28 the court established a new exception to the derivative evi-
dence rule. The court held that a witness' testimony is admissible at
trial even if the name of the witness was discovered as a result of un-
lawful police conduct.29 This result was an incursion into the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine, and foreshadowed the incorporation
of the inevitable discovery exception into New York case law.
In the instant case the petitioner contended that it was reversi-
ble error for the court to have admitted into evidence the revolver
tainted by the defective Miranda warnings. If the court were to accept
the evidence under the inevitable discovery exception, the exclusionary
22. Maguire, supra note 8. E.g., Killough v. United States, 336 F.2d 929 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
860 (1963); People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 369 P.2d 714, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1962).
23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
24. See, e.g., People v. Variano, 5 N.Y.2d 391, 157 N.E.2d 857, 185 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1959); Application of Silfa, 18 Misc. 2d 800, 162 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
People v. Fay, 182 Misc. 358, 43 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
25. I1 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962).
26. Id. at 286, 183 N.E.2d at 653-54, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 357. See also Cleary v.
Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 402-03 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
27. See, People v. Paulin, 25 N.Y.2d 445, 255 N.E.2d 164, 306 N.Y.S.2d 929
(1969); People v. Dentine, 21 N.Y.2d 700, 234 N.E.2d 462, 287 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 967 (1968); People v. Ballott, 20 N.Y.2d 600, 233 N.E.2d 103,
286 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967); People v. Chennault, 20 N.Y.2d 518, 232 N.E.2d 324, 285
N.Y.S.2d 289 (1967) ; People v. Robinson, 13 N.Y.2d 296, 196 N.E.2d 261, 246 N.Y.S.2d
623 (1963).
28. People v. Mendez, 28 N.Y.2d 94, 268 N.E.2d 778, 320 N.Y.S.2d 39, cert. denied,
404 U.S. 911 (1971).
29. For a detailed analysis of this exception, see Pitler, supra note 10, at 621-24.
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rule would be subject to erosion. The court of appeals rejected the
position of the petitioner. Chief Judge Fuld, writing for the court3
0
noted that the inevitable discovery exception had been adopted by
other jurisdictions on the basis of Wong Sun. He espoused the view
that the police would have discovered the gun even without the pe-
titioner's statement. "[I]t was entirely fortuitous that the police de-
layed the search of the immediate area where the defendant was dis-
covered until they had begun questioning him . . . ."1 The court
countered the contention that the exclusionary rule would be eroded
by noting that as long as the government must show that the illegal
act was not a sine qua non of the discovery of the evidence, the ex-
clusionary rule would remain intact.
The fashioning of an acceptable standard by which courts can
apply the inevitable discovery exception presents difficulties. Under
the "independent source" rule of Silverthorne, courts have only to
examine past events in order to determine whether the secondary
evidence was the result of a lawful lead. Under the inevitable dis-
covery exception, courts are forced to forecast the future in order
to decide whether a lawful lead would have arisen. At present, under
the inevitable discovery exception, the only guideline is the necessity
of finding that the evidence would, rather than could, have inevitably
been found. As the scholar cited by the court of appeals in the instant
case explains:
The significance of the word "would" cannot be overemphasized.
It is not enough to show that the evidence "might" or "could" have
been otherwise obtained. Once the illegal act is shown to have been
in fact the sole effective cause of the discovery of certain evidence,
such evidence is inadmissible unless the prosecution severs the causal
connection by an affirmative showing that it would have acquired
the evidence in any event. In order to avoid the exclusionary rule,
the government must establish that it has not benefitted by the illegal
acts of its agents; a showing that it might not have so benefitted is
insufficient.
3 2
The problem involves drawing a line between would and could. Some
reasonable test must be formulated so that courts are not forced in
30. It is perhaps ironic that Chief Judge (then Judge) Fuld authored the
Rodriguez case ushering into New York case law the derivative evidence exception to the
exclusionary rule.
31. Instant case at 507, 300 N.E.2d at 142, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
32. Maguire, supra note 8, at 315 (emphasis in original).
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each case to drift from the realm of certainty to the domain of proba-
bility.33
One of the attractions of the exclusionary rule is that it should
act as an incentive to law enforcement officers to raise their levels of
professionalism and to better their methods of investigation. With-
out carefully defined limits, the inevitable discovery exception will
significantly diminish this incentive. Police will not perform in-
vestigations under constitutional standards as announced by the
courts; instead, their own predictions as to what is inevitable will
guide their conduct.
In the final analysis, whether the inevitable discovery exception
is valid must be weighed against the purpose of the exclusionary rule:
will unlawful police conduct be deterred?34 The answer lies in the
limits of the exception itself. If the exception is given a very broad
scope, it would be capable of swallowing the exclusionary rule. If
carefully defined standards could be found for application of the
exception,3 5 the purpose of the exclusionary rule might be preserved.
In the instant case, no such standards were considered and, as a re-
sult, the exclusionary rule in New York is susceptible to further
erosion.
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND ARRESTS AND THE
SCOPE OF SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Apart from being "fruit of the poisonous tree," the petitioner
argued that the gun should have been suppressed from evidence
on grounds that it was located outside the scope of a permissible search
incident to arrest. The United States Supreme Court's position on the
boundaries of a search incident to arrest has fluctuated greatly. In
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,36 the Court took a very nar-
row view of what was permissible. There, papers taken from the
33. judge Wachtler, in a concurring opinion to the instant case, suggests that the
exception should include only sources that would have arisen by ordinary requirements
of the law, rather than probabilities of individual actions. This standard might have
enough specificity that courts could apply it generally. Instant case at 513, 300 N.E.2d
at 146, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
34. See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42
NEB. L. REv. 483, 548-49 (1963); Pitler, supra note 10, at 627-29. See also, United
States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1962).
35. See note 33 supra.
36. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
RECENT CASES
arrestee's office desk and safe were suppressed because no crime was
committed in the officers' presence and the officers had plenty of
time to obtain a warrant. One year later, the Court again liberally
construed the fourth amendment in United States v. Lefkowit
37
and affirmed Go-Bart. Harris v. United States38 manifested a new
shift in the Supreme Court's approach. In that case a search un-
covered evidence of a crime unrelated to that for which an arrest
warrant had been issued. The Supreme Court allowed the evidence
to be introduced strictly on the grounds that the search of the peti-
tioner's four room apartment was "incident to his arrest" under war-
rant. Trupiano v. United States39 indicated a new change in the posi-
tion of the Court. Evidence seized by federal agents during a raid
was suppressed because the Court found that a search warrant was
necessary wherever reasonably practical, and that the agents had more
than enough time to secure one.
The current stance taken by the Supreme Court on the permis-
sible scope of a search incident to arrest was promulgated in Chimel v.
California.40 In that case Santa Ana police officers served a valid arrest
warrant on the petitioner and searched his three bedroom home
despite his protestations. Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority,
set the outer perimeter of a search incident to an arrest at the "area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evi-
dentiary items. '41 The Court was concerned not only for the safety
of the arresting officer, but also with the prevention of the destruc-
tion or concealment of evidence by the individual under arrest.4
2
New York has incorporated the Chimel restrictions into its case
law.4 3 A remark in People v. Floyd,44 however, while nominally ac-
cepting the Chimel rule, introduced a new interpretation. In Floyd,
the court of appeals determined that petitioner's arrest was unlaw-
ful and excluded evidence discovered in conjunction with the arrest.
Nonetheless, Judge Breitel, in reference to petitioner's argument
37. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
38. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
39. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
40. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
41. Id. at 763.
42. Id.
43. E.g., People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558, 260 N.E.2d 815, 312 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1970); People v. Gonzalez, 33 App. Div. 2d 762, 305 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1969).
44. 26 N.Y.2d at 558, 260 N.E.2d at 817, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 196 (1970).
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that the evidence was also inadmissible under Chimel, left open the
question of "grabbing distance":
It suffices that it is not at all clear that the "grabbing distance"
authorization in the Chimel case is conditioned upon the arrested per-
son's continued capacity to grab.
45
Until the instant case, no court in New York has taken upon itself
the burden of clarifying Judge Breitel's doubts.
Turning aside from the Chimel rule, the petitioner also urged
that the warrantless entry, search and seizure rendered the weapon in-
admissible at trial. At present, the United States Supreme Court re-
quires that a law enforcement officer obtain a search warrant in
order to enter an individual's home for the purpose of seizing evi-
dence.46 On the other hand, the Court follows the common law rule
that an officer does not need an arrest or search warrant to enter a
home for the purpose of making an arrest.47 The government de-
fended this apparent inconsistency in Jones v. United States.48 The
Supreme Court disposed of the case on other grounds and thereby
avoided the issue of whether any warrant was necessary. However, Mr.
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, did raise some doubt on the
subject:
These contentions . . . would confront us with a grave constitutional
question, namely, whether the forceful nighttime entry into a dwell-
ing to arrest a person reasonably believed within upon probable
cause that he had committed a felony under the circumstances
where no reason appears why an arrest warrant could not have been
sought is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
49
A direct confrontation has not yet materialized, 0 and state courts
continue to follow the common law principle.
The Supreme Court has indicated that it may be ready to elimi-
nate the present dichotomy of treatment between entry to make a
45. Id.
46. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S.
610 (1961) ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
47. See Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23
STAN. L. REv. 995 (1971).
48. 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
49. Id. at 499-500.
50. Ironically, Mr. Justice Harlan was again able to note 13 years later that the
issue, though discussed by the majority and minority opinions, remained unanswered.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971) (concurring opinion).
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warrantless arrest and entry to make a warrantless search. In Warden
v. Haydenl the petitioner was seen entering a home after committing
an armed robbery. Within five minutes, the police converged on the
home and proceeded to enter and search for the petitioner. The Su-
preme Court found the entry, search, and arrest valid, but relied
upon the "exigencies of the situation," 52 rather than common law
principles. The problem left unresolved by the decision is what con-
stitutes "exigency"? The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has attempted to fashion some guidelines.53
To determine whether exigent circumstances existed, the court sug-
gested a consideration of the following factors: whether the crime in-
volved was one of violence; whether the police officer had reason to
believe his suspect was armed; whether something more than probable
cause existed to lead the police officer to believe his suspect had
committed a crime; whether there was strong reason to believe the sus-
pect was inside; whether there was strong likelihood of escape by the
suspect if not swiftly apprehended; whether the entry was made peace-
fully.54 These factors were not intended to be conclusive on the issue
of whether "exigency" existed, but rather they are an aid to the court
in making a case-by-case evaluation of the situation at the time the
entry was made.15
New York's Criminal Procedure Law56 embodies the common
law rule and defines the circumstances under which an entry may be
made to perform a warrantless arrest.57 A police officer making an
entry to arrest without a warrant has no greater restrictions imposed
on his conduct than an officer making an entry to arrest with a war-
rant. 8
51. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
52. Id. at 298.
53. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 391-96 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc).
54. Id. at 392-93.
55. Id. at 392.
56. N.Y. CRIA. PRO. LAW (McKinney 1971) (hereinafter cited as CPL).
57. Id. § 140.15.
58. Id. § 120.80 states:
(1) A warrant of arrest may be executed on any day of the week and at any
hour of the day or night. (2) Unless encountering physical resistance, flight
or other factors rendering normal procedure impractical, the arresting police
officer must inform the defendant that a warrant for his arrest for the offense
designated therein has been issued. Upon request of the defendant, the police
officer must show him the warrant if he has it in his possession. The officer
need not have the warrant in his possession, and, if he has not, he must show
it to the defendant upon request as soon after the arrest as possible. (3) In
285
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In the instant case, the court of appeals disagreed with the peti-
tioner's contention that the revolver was outside the boundary created
by Chimel. The court stated that the gun in the closet was certainly
within a "grabbable" area. The fact that the closet was not searched
until after the petitioner was handcuffed had no effect whatsoever
on the validity of the search. Quoting from the Floyd opinion, the
court reiterated its doubts about the restrictions on a search incident
to arrest: "it is not at all clear that the 'grabbing distance' authorized
in the Chimel case is conditioned upon the arrested person's continued
capacity 'to grab.'-59
The court of appeals found that the absence of search and arrest
warrants did not affect the admissibility of the pistol either. The court
noted that a man named Fitzpatrick had shot two policemen; that the
getaway car belonged to a friend of Martin Fitzpatrick; and, that the
petitioner's home was near the spot where he had last been seen. For
these reasons, the court stated that the police had more than probable
cause to arrest the petitioner and that it was reasonable to believe that
the petitioner was inside the house. The court went further, however,
in justifying the entry, search, and arrest by noting that speed was
essential, and that the police were authorized to act without war-
rants in the interest of public safety.
In Chimel, the Supreme Court narrowly defined the limits of
search incident to arrest. The Court specifically stated that the ar-
resting officer was permitted to search for weapons within a "grabba-
order to effect the arrest, the police officer may use such physical force as is
justifiable pursuant to section 35.50 of the penal law. (4) In order to effect
the arrest, the police officer may, under circumstances and in a manner pre-
scribed in this subdivision, enter premises in which he reasonably believes the
defendant to be present. Before such entry, he must give, or make reasonable
effort to give, notice of his authority and purpose to an occupant thereof,
unless there is reasonable cause to believe that the giving of such notice
will: (a) Result in the defendant escaping or attempting to escape; or (b)
Endanger the life or safety of the officer or another person; or (c) Result in
the destruction, damaging or secretion of material evidence. (5) If the officer
is authorized to enter premises without giving notice of his authority and pur-
pose, or if after giving such notice he is not admitted, he may enter such
premises, and by a breaking if necessary.
CPL § 140.15 (4) provides:
In order to effect such an arrest [without warrant], a police officer may enter
premises in which he reasonably believes such person to be present, under the
same circumstances and in the same manner as would be authorized, by the pro-
visions of subdivisions four and five of section 120.80, if he were attempting
to make such arrest pursuant to a warrant of arrest.
59. Instant case at 508, 300 N.E.2d at 143, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
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ble" distance to insure his own safety.60 The Court also reasoned that
the officer was permitted to search for evidence within the same limits
to prevent its destruction. 61 Mr. Justice Stewart went on to declare
that
[t]here is no comparable justification, however, for routinely search-
ing any room other than that in which an arrest occurs-or, for that
matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed
or concealed areas .... Such searches, in the absence of exceptions,
6 2
may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.
6 3
A logical conclusion to be drawn from the Court's analysis is that if
the arresting officer's safety obviously is not endangered, or if no evi-
dence is subject to destruction, no search may be made. Consequently,
once the arrestee is forcibly subdued, the threat posed to evidence
and personal safety ceases to exist and further searching becomes
impermissible.
The Fitzpatrick opinion is dearly incompatible with the Chimel
rationale. To reach the result in the instant case, one must assume
that a closet, a number of feet away, was within the "grabbable" range
of a handcuffed man. Perhaps to counter the criticism that it had
assumed too much in the instant case, the court based its decision on
the Floyd remark that the term "grabbing distance" is not dependent
on the arrestee's continued capacity to grab.6 4 From the very super-
ficial treatment given to Chimel in that case, it is obvious that the court
had not intended its statement to be definitive. Nonetheless, the court
of appeals in the instant case accepted it as such without providing a
logical explanation as to why the Chimel restrictions should be
diluted.
Assuming the validity of this interpretation of Chimel, the court
finds strong foundation for the legality of the entry, arrest and
search. The opinion cites numerous factors which provided more than
probable cause to search and arrest.65 Furthermore, it found warrants
to be unnecessary for the officers' conduct. The common law rule em-
60. 395 U.S. at 763.
61. Id.
62. E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) ("hot pursuit"); see Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1967).
63. 395 U.S. at 763 (emphasis added).
64. People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558, 563, 260 N.E.2d 815, 817, 312 N.Y.S.2d 193,
196 (1970).
65. Instant case at 509, 300 N.E.2d at 143, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
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bodied by the New York Criminal Procedure Law would seem to
justify amply the position of the court of appeals in the instant case.
Nevertheless, it is surprising to note that the court did not mention
the statutory authorization for the officers' actions. An explanation for
this "omission" is that the court of appeals has unexpressed doubts
about the constitutionality of a warrantless entry and arrest in the
absence of "exigent" circumstances. Since Justice Harlan's statement
in Jones, the issue has been left unresolved by the Supreme Court.
Warden v. Hayden is indicative of the Supreme Court's drift towards
placing entry and arrest on the same plane as entry and seizure of
evidence where a warrant is normally required unless certain, speci-
fied circumstances exist. This drift explains why the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered the
factors contributing to "exigency." 6 By grounding its opinion on
those same factors, the New York Court of Appeals indicates that it
has also perceived the same trend.
NEw YoRK's DEATH PENALTY STATUTE
The United States Supreme Court has assumed, if not asserted,
the validity of the death penalty whenever the issue has arisen.0 7 The
Court completely reversed its position on the death penalty by a vote
of 5-4 in Furman v. Georgia.68 The petitioner's sentences as imposed
under Texas 9 and Georgia 70 legislation were overturned on the basis
of two theories. Justices Brennan and Marshall based their opinions
on the grounds that capital punishment was per se "cruel and unusual"
and therefore prohibited by the eighth amendment. Justices Douglas,
Stewart and White noted that the statutes left the imposition of the
death sentence to the unfettered discretion of the jury thereby creating
the possibility that the penalty would be applied discriminatorily. The
discretionary aspect of the statute, rather than the severity of the
punishment, was found to violate the eighth amendment. The dissent
66. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
67. Note, The Death Penalty-The Alternatives Left After Furman v. Georgia, 37
ALBANY L. REV. 344, 346-50 (1973).
68. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
69. Tax. PENAL CODE, art. 1189 (1961). Texas has adopted a new penal code
effective January 1, 1974 which no longer provides for capital punishment.
70. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1005, -1302 (Spec. Supp. 1971) (effective for crimes
committed prior to July 1, 1969), as amended, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101, -2001 (1971).
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accused the majority of usurping the powers of the legislatures and
of failing to exercise proper judicial restraint.
Under the New York Penal Law, the death penalty may be im-
posed only for the crime of murder and only in certain circumstances.
7'
If those circumstances exist, the convicted defendant is subjected to
a "penalty trial" 72 where the jury decides whether capital punishment
will be imposed.
71. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.30 (McKinney Supp. 1972):
(1) When a defendant has been convicted by a jury verdict of murder as
defined in subdivision one or three of section 125.25 the court shall, as promptly
as practicable, conduct a further proceeding, pursuant to section 125.35, in
order to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death in
lieu of being sentenced to the term of imprisonment for a class A felony
prescribed in section 70.00, if it is satisfied that: (a) Either: (i) the victim
of the crime was a peace officer who was killed in the course of performing
his official duties, or (ii) the victim was an employee of a local jail, penitentiary
or correctional institution performing his official duties, or (iii) at the time of
the commission of the crime the defendant was confined in a state prison or
was otherwise in custody upon a sentence for the term of his natural life, or
upon a sentence commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an
indeterminate term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the
maximum of which was natural life, or having escaped from such confinement
or custody the defendant was in immediate flight therefrom; and (b) The
defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission
of the crime; and (c) there are no substantial mitigating circumstances which
render sentence of death unwarranted. (2) If the court conducts such a further
proceeding with respect to a sentence, the jury verdict of murder recorded upon
the minutes shall not be subject to jury reconsideration therein.
72. Id. at § 125.35 (McKinney 1967):
Any further proceeding authorized by section 125.30 with respect to a sentence
for murder shall be conducted in the manner provided in this section. (2)
Such proceeding shall be conducted before the court sitting with the jury
that found defendant guilty unless the court for good cause discharges that
jury and impanels a new jury for that purpose. (3) In such proceeding, evi-
dence may be presented by either party on any matter relevant to sentence in-
cluding, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime, de-
fendant's background and history, and any aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances. Any relevant evidence, not legally privileged, shall be received regardless
of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence. (4) The court shall
charge the jury on any matters appropriate in the circumstances, including
the law relating to the maximum and possible release on parole of a person
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a class A felony. (5) The jury shall
then retire to consider the penalty to be imposed. If the jury report unanimous
agreement on the imposition of the penalty of death, the court shall discharge
the jury and shall impose the sentence of death. If the jury report unanimous
agreement on the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, the court shall
discharge the jury and shall impose such sentence. If, after the lapse of such
time as the court deems reasonable, the jury report themselves unable to
agree, the court shall discharge the jury and shall, in its discretion, either
impanel a new jury to determine the sentence or impose the sentence of im-
prisonment.
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- In the instant case, the court of appeals agreed with the peti-
tioner that the New York statute providing for the death sentence
was unconstitutional. In reviewing Furman v. Georgia, Chief Judge
Fuld concluded that the plurality's objection to capital punishment
was based upon the fact that imposition of the penalty was left solely
to the discretion of the jury. Finding that the New York Penal Law
contained this same defect, the court overturned the sentence.
The legislative response to Furman might take a variety of forms.
73
A constitutional amendment is one possibility.7" Alternatively, legis-
lation -might be drafted to limit the discretionary power of the judge
and jury.75 A return to a system of mandatory death penalties for cer-
tain serious crimes is a third solution.70 Finally, states might wait and
let the Supreme Court review their individual death penalty statutes
on the assumption that only those which are wholly discretionary will
be invalidated.
Assuming that the legislature of New York desired to reinstitute
capital punishment in the state, two immediate possibilities exist:
a mandatory death sentence for certain offenses; 77 or, the creation of
specified guidelines to be taken into account by the judge and jury.
78
Of these two the latter would appear to be more desirable. Manda-
tory sentencing is regressive and whether it eliminates discretion is
questionable. Prosecutors who make the decisions on what charges




People v. Fitzpatrick signifies several important developments in
New York criminal law. It heralds the arrival of the inevitable dis-
73. See Vance, The Death Penalty After Furman, 48 NOTRE DADIE LAWVYER 854-57
(1973); Note, supra note 67.
74. Vance, supra note 73, at 854.
75. State v. Dixon, 13 Cums. L. RPTR. 2495 (Fla. July 26, 1973) (upholding
constitutionality of Florida statute); FLA. STAT. ANN. SESS. LAWS 1972, ch. 72-724,
§ 921.141; S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
76. California has recently enacted such a statute. Washington Post, Sept. 25, 1973,
§ A, at 2, col. 1.
77. E.g., id.
78. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. SEss. LAWS 1972, ch. 72-724, § 921.141; S. 1400, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
79. Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 13 Ciui. L. RPTR. 3265, 3271
(1973).
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covery exception; it foreshadows the replacement of the common law
principle governing entry to make a warrantless arrest with an "exi-
gent circumstances" rationale; and, it expunges capital punishment
from the New York Penal Law. It will be interesting to see whether
the courts limit Fitzpatrick to the very difficult fact situation that it
presented, or whether the expansive search and seizure principles ar-
ticulated therein will be applied regularly.
JOHN M. MENDENHALL
CRIMINAL LAW-SUBDIVISION OF NEW YORK LOITERING STATUTE
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE-THE EFFECT OF CONSIDERATIONS
WHICH ARE COLLATERAL TO THE "VAGUENESS" PROBLEM.
Defendant observed standing behind a tree in front of a tem-
porarily unoccupied house at one o'clock in the morning was ques-
tioned by police concerning his presence. Subsequently, he was ar-
rested upon his failure to identify himself or to give a reasonably
credible account of his behavior and convicted of loitering under
New York Penal Law § 240.35 (6) .- The appellate division affirmed
and defendant appealed, by permission of an associate judge, to the
court of appeals. In a four to three decision, the court reversed,
holding that section 240-35 (6) violates due process of law in that its
language is so vague as to fail adequately to inform an individual of
the conduct which it prohibits. People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300
N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1973).
The court in the instant case was called upon to settle an issue
which had caused considerable turmoil among lower tribunals in
New York. In the five prior instances when local courts had under-
taken to determine the constitutionality of subdivision six, two had
1. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(6) (McKinney 1967):
A person is guilty of loitering when he:
6. Loiters, remains or wanders in or about a place without apparent reason
and under circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or
about to engage in crime, and, upon inquiry by a peace officer, refuses to
identify himself or fails to give a reasonable credible account of his conduct
and purposes ....
